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Defendant App-t 11 HI it , : 
JURISDICTION M P NATVRP -QF FfrQQEEPINgS 
Defendant appeal t' lip.-! (..'onvirt I.<MI f. nninJtM, I i i «ii degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995),, This 
Court has jurisdiction ^in^r ntah ^ < ^ Ann § 78 2 2(3) (i ) (3 9 9 5 ) . 
ISSUJL-b FK£S£NTEb un APPEAL AND 
STANPARPS OF APPELATE REVIEW 
Summary Introduction of Issues 
Th i ;-:i appeal I i i ivi i Iv^s I i * va r r .:-n-it I pRq pntri er i nt i 
defendant's family heme. : h- first \. seize and detain defendant 
in connection with a :a:u. shootina occurring onJy minutes 
before, and the second, ai i hour later , to search for and seize ' 
the mutrdei weapon. The trial court upheld the first entry based 
c i i n'" 11 n s e n t a r J <:J i LI. v i" 11 a t i v e I)", e ;>•:; i y e i i t 
circumstances. The court validated the second entry based on the 
homeowner's writer consent. Defendant attacks the fi rst consent 
h (11 i "i >eiir c" ,;i i i i i -1 in in! I • i 11 in. m s t h a t e x i g e n t 
circumstances did not exist to otherwise justify the entry. He 
asserts that the second consent is invalid because it is not 
sufficiently attenuated from this alleged prior illegality. 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant's 
father, the owner of the home, voluntarily consented to the 
warrantless police entry into his home to search for and seize 
defendant in connection with a murder, minutes after the crime 
had been committed? 
"Voluntariness is primarily a factual question, see 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973)." State 
v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993). Because the trial 
judge is in an "advantaged position in judging credibility and 
resolving evidentiary conflicts," the trial court's factual 
findings underlying its conclusion of voluntariness "will not be 
set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." Id. at 
1271. The court's "ultimate conclusion that a consent was 
voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness." Id. 
However, this Court will afford a "measure of discretion" to the 
trial court's determination because the legal standard is "highly 
fact dependent and the fact patterns are quite variable." See 
State v. Hodson. 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995) (quoting State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994)). 
2 
2 I I t e r a t i vely, d.i ol" I I"ie f t:i a I uu t t correi . 7e 
t li at ex ig ent c i :i CII: i msta n> zes a cicil jproJbaJble cause supported the 
w a r r a n t l e s s I i i l t l a l entr;) i n t o I: he home t o seize d e f e n d a n t ? 
h h e 11 i e r e x i g e r 11 c 11 c i 11 i i s t a i i c e s e x :i s t i s a £ a ::: t ::i e p e n d e i 11 
determination subject to a bifurcated standard of review. "The 
trial court's far-tuo"! findings wil ] not be disturbed on appeal 
l. -* - - - - : s • i j J j ^ ^ JSkSilfi/ * 
(Utah 1987;. But the •:..\,:t £• leg?,', . onclusicn based c:. rr-M-^ 
findings is viewed under a correction of e^ror stanu^; : 'Jit\ of 
Or em v. Henri e , 868 P.za iio*, iibo vutah App. ISb>4/ siting 
Thurman, ^4 •: I- I d o ' : : " ; "" ' x . See also Hodson 9 r n ~ 2 5 o : 
11 .if ; — . . 
legal conclusions afforded a "measure of discretion ) . 
3 Assuming arguendo that this Court Invalidates ,Jbo:th home 
< J 
other physical evidence constitute reversible e;;,~r w> - ••: 
uncontesteu LMUL defendant intentionally snot the unarmed victim 
a t pointblank ra nge and the only issue at trial was whether the 
killing constituted murder, manslaughter or self'-defense? 
W i it'ii ci I i i d I "i M I I I I lit i I ' I i i * I j p i u e s s i 1 l e g , i I I y s f i v e i l 
evidence, the resulting conviction will not be reversed if 
substantial independent evidence of defendant's guilt supports 
the jury's verdict such that the appellate court may conclude, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no likelihood of a 
different result. State v. Villarreal. 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 
(Utah 1995) (Sixth amendment violation harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt); State v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 922-24 (Utah 
App. 1995) (Fourth amendment violation harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RTfliES 
Defendant challenges the warrantless entries on the basis of 
federal and state constitutional warrant requirements which read: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV [Unreasonable 
searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
thing to be seized. 
4 
STATEMENT QF THE CAgE 
Defendant, Anthony Archuleta, was arrested on February 
3, 1994, for the murder of Roland Zahorka (R. 603). At the time, 
defendant was sixteen years old; he would turn seventeen the next 
month (R. 921). Subsequently, defendant was certified to stand 
trial as an adult (R. 5-12, 1175-1184). Defendant does not 
challenge his adult status. 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress the physical 
evidence seized from his family's home on the night of his arrest 
(R. 28). Following an evidentiary hearing (R. 74, 76, 273-426), 
the motion was denied (R. 77, 234-40) . See Addendum A, Trial 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
A four-day jury trial commenced on October 17, 1994 (R. 156-
232), and resulted in defendant's conviction of murder (R. 229, 
232). On December 20, 1994, he was sentenced to the statutory 
term of five-years-to-life in the Utah State Prison with a 
consecutive one-year term under the firearm enhancement 
provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1995) (R. 242-43) . 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 246) . On appeal, defendant 
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
conviction or the appropriateness of his prison sentence; 
instead, defendant challenges only the denial of his motion to 
5 
suppress the seized murder weapon and ammunition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Roland (Bo) Zahorka, a thirty-eight year old construction 
worker, just wanted to use the public telephone at a local gas 
station (R. 865). That wish cost him his life. 
The Shooting 
It began as a day like any other day. Bo and his friend, 
John Brown, were doing carpentry work on a new home (R. 833-34). 
After work, they went to a local bar, the "Hops and Barley," 
where Bo had a few beers (R. 834) .2 The two left the bar after 
an hour, stopped for cigarettes, stopped to pick up some papers 
from John's apartment, and then drove down 300 East (R. 835-36 ). 
It was about 6:30 p.m. and Bo decided to call his roommate to 
tell him he was running late (R. 583, 865). Spotting an outside 
telephone at a Phillips 66 gas station on the corner of 3 900 
1
 Much of defendant's recitation of the facts (see Brief of Appellant [Br.App.] at 3-14) 
contradicts the record evidence and fails to fairly marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict or the trial court's ruling denying the motion to suppress. The State sets forth the record 
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict and ruling. State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 
1230 (Utah 1996); State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989). 
2
 At some point during the day, Bo apparently also ingested cocaine since the medical 
examiner found some evidence of cocaine in his system during the autopsy. However, the level 
of cocaine was "below a quantifiable limit," "so small they could not give it an accurate number 
as to what the level was" (R. 711), so low that its effect would have been minimal (R. 715). 
Despite this, defendant unfairly characterizes the victim as being in a "drug induced condition" 
(Br.App. at 7). 
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South and 300 East, Bo pulled in (R. 836 ). See Addendum C, 
State's Exhibit 2 (photograph of Phillips station). 
In doing so, Bo may have driven in a bit too fast, perhaps 
10-15 miles per hour.3 In any case, he stopped near the curb in 
front of the public telephone where defendant was standing (R. 
775, 794, 809, 841 ). See Addendum C, State's Exhibit 3 
(photograph of telephone area). 
For defendant, the day was not just another day, it was 
another bad day. Defendant and his fourteen-year-old brother, 
Joey, were living with their father, who had a drinking problem 
(R. 375, 922). Defendant's mother, who had remarried, was 
concerned about the arrangement. The father drank, the kids 
lacked discipline, and the kids' friends were involved with drugs 
and gangs (R. 922-23) . In January, both sons were at a party 
where a friend of theirs, Jeremy Gaitin, had been stabbed to 
3
 Numerous witnesses observed Bo's truck drive in but their observations differed. 
Ronny Manzaneres thought Bo drove in "pretty fast" and was "going to run over" defendant 
who was standing on top of the curb in front of the telephone (R. 775). Ronny's sister thought 
Bo was driving fast but stopped at least 6 feet away from defendant (R. 793-94). Another 
witness judged Bo's speed to be about 10-15 mph while Bo's passenger felt they were "coasting" 
in, perhaps at 5 mph (R. 821, 838-40). Noreen Borup was the most descriptive: Bo drove in "not 
fast, but not real slow. It was just like someone pulling up that needed to use the phone, you 
know; maybe it was in a little bit of a hurry, but not anything really screeching to a halt or 
anything like that"... he stopped "not really close, but fairly close" to the telephone island (R. 
811). Whatever Bo's speed, defendant conceded that the truck did not hit him and stopped at 
least one foot away (R. 958-60). 
7 
death by members of an Hispanic gang (R. 948-50, 999) . 
Defendant's mother wanted him to move out of state to live with 
an older brother (R. 924, 927). 
The mother believed her son was a peaceful and non-
aggressive child. But she knew that he acted differently when he 
was not around her and, like most mothers of teenagers, knew only 
part of the story (R. 932-38). Most tragically, she did not know 
that whenever defendcint left the house, he carried a fully loaded 
.22 caliber semi-automatic pistol (R. 932, 954, 978, 983). 
Defendant talked to his mother twice the day he killed Bo 
Zahorka. In the morning, he called his mother upset because his 
dad was continuing to drink, depressed over his friend Jeremy's 
death, and scared over threats not to identify the murdering gang 
member (R. 924). When the mother returned home from work that 
evening, she received a second call from defendant, but this one 
was different (id.). Defendant's mom could tell that he had 
been drinking and felt that he was ''talking crazy" (R. 926, 932) . 
She was concerned that he would seek revenge for his friend's 
killing and she encouraged him uto leave it to the police" (R. 
927). She told defendant he needed counseling (id. ). 
After this last call, defendant told his father that he was 
moving out. The father wanted to talk but defendant was "mad" 
8 
and did not want to (R. 945-46). Instead, defendant got his 
loaded gun and left (R. 954-55). The dad knew defendant was 
"angry" but figured he "just needed a little time to blow off 
steam" (R. 946). 
When defendant left the house, he walked across the street 
to the Phillips 66 station about one hundred feet from his home 
(R. 286, 954, 956). His friend, Devin Espinoza, a gang member, 
accompanied him (R. 954, 989). Defendant went to the outside 
telephone at the station and called a girlfriend to pick him up 
(R. 955) .4 After the call, he and Devin waited at the telephone 
(R. 956). 
4
 Defendant asserts that he went to the gas station to use the "pay phone because the 
killers knew where he lived... and [he] didn't want them to come over to my house" (Br.App. at 
4). The evidence was much simpler: 
[Defense counsel]: Now did you make—did you call April from the phone at your 
home? 
[Defendant]: No. 
[Counsel]: Why not? 
[Defendant]: My dad wouldn't give me the phone. 
[Counsel]: Did you then leave the house? 
[Defendant]: Yes. 
[Counsel]: For what purpose? 
[Defendant]: To go use the closest phone. 
Defendant's mischaracterization of the facts supports his counsel's theory that Bo Zahorka's 
death was somehow connected to Jeremy Gaitin's death, £££, e.g., Br.App. at 3-5, but is 
inconsistent with defendant's own testimony. Defendant testified he was not even thinking about 
his friend's death or his fear of retaliation from a rival gang when he shot Bo (R. 1005,1024-25, 
1034). 
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The station was busy and people were coming in and out. 
Maria Lopez walked over to the telephone to use it (R. 773). 
Ronny Manzaneres and his sister Michelle Ostmark pulled into 
the station when they saw Ronny's girlfriend Maria using the 
telephone and defendant and Devin standing nearby (R. 770-74). 
Ronny recognized Devin but did not know defendant (R. 773-74) . 
Ronny walked over to his girlfriend and told her to get in his 
sister's car. Defendant and Devin asked Ronny if he "had a 
problem" and "did he want to get crazy," meaning "did he want to 
fight" (R. 774, 781). Ronny replied, "No, I don't got no 
problem. You shouldn't pick on my girlfriend" (id.).5 It was at 
that moment that Bo Zahorka drove his truck into the station. 
When Bo stopped his truck, defendant yelled, "What are you 
trying to do, run me over?" (R. 777-78). At the same time, he 
banged on the hood of the truck (R. 960). Bo got out and yelled 
back, "I didn't hit you" (R. 842), "Why are you hitting my car?" 
(R. 961). Bo said he wanted to use the phone, defendant told him 
he couldn't, and Bo replied that it was a public phone (R. 822, 
843). The two were now close to each other (R. 823, 844). 
Defendant pushed Bo and Bo staggered back (R. 798, 812, 844). 
5
 At trial, defendant denied seeing Maria at the telephone or exchanging words with 
Ronny (R. 995-96). 
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Bo then pushed defendant (R. 798).6 
By this point, many bystanders were aware of the escalating 
confrontation. Some wanted to leave (R. 777); one wanted to call 
the police (R. 884); another ducked behind his car and pretended 
to check his tires (R. 827, 828-29). But the ones that watched 
saw defendant shoot Bo Zahorka (R. 812-13, 823-24, 829). 
After Bo pushed defendant, Bo stood with his hands by his 
sides; his hands were empty (R. 851-52, 1004). Defendant turned 
to Devin, and said "give me that," referring to defendant's gun 
which Devin had in his waistband (R. 844) . Defendant turned back 
to face Bo (R. 812). Defendant raised the loaded gun to shoulder 
height and pointed it directly at Bo (R. 813, 829, 845, 847, 
1003) . Foolishly, Bo laughed and said, "What are you going to 
do, you little punk, shoot me?"(R. 964, 1014-15). With the 
barrel of the gun touching Bo's chest, defendant fired (R. 813, 
847, 964, 1014-16). 
Bo lunged and cried out, wOh God, I've been hit" (R. 847). 
He fell to the ground (R. 813, 829, 847). Defendant and Devin 
ran (R. 814, 823, 830, 965). 
6
 Bo's passenger, John, and defendant's friend, Devin, were standing in the same small 
area but did not participate in the verbal exchange or shoving match (R. 812,1017). 
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Minutes later, they were apprehended in defendant's family 
home across the street from the station (R. 583-603) .7 
The Explanation 
When originally arrested, defendant asked Officer Sampson if 
"they took you to jail or the D.T. [juvenile detention center] 
for shooting someone" (R. 606). Sampson did not know (id.) 
Later at the jail, defendant denied any involvement in the 
shooting (R. 752-59; Exhibit 28, transcript of defendant's 
unchallenged Mirandized taped statement). Defendant insisted 
that he had not left his home all night and the eyewitnesses were 
lying (Exhibit 28). The police repeatedly asked if he had been 
defending himself or if there was some reason for the shooting: 
they asked "Why? Just Why? That's all we want to know is why?" 
(Exhibit 28 at 12). 
At trial, the question was still "why." 
7
 Because the facts surrounding the consensual searches of defendant's family's home are 
lengthy and challenged by defendant, they will be discussed more fully in the applicable 
argument portion of this brief. In sum, witnesses saw defendant and Devin flee the shooting and 
escape to their home (R. 322-24,278-80,285-86). The police surrounded the home and called 
for the occupants to come out (R. 292-93, 336). When defendant's father emerged, he was 
detained at gunpoint, but once it was determined that he was not armed and was not a suspect, he 
was "released" (R. 293-94, 343). He then orally consented to a limited police entry to search for 
the suspects. Defendant and Devin were found and arrested (R. 293-95, 343-45). An hour later, 
the father provided a written consent to search and the police re-entered the home and located the 
murder weapon and ammunition (R. 349-53,360-63). 
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Defense counsel attempted to picture defendant as a 
depressed young man, in fear of attack from gang members who had 
recently murdered his friend, and who was just trying to defend 
himself from a somewhat larger, older male with "an attitude" 
(R. 573-81, 1001, 1111-27). On appeal, counsel paints this same 
portrait while insinuating that defendant "accidentally" shot the 
victim (Br.App. at 6-7).8 But as much as counsel would like to 
advocate these arguments, defendant testified that he 
intentionally shot Bo Zahorka for reasons entirely apart from his 
friend's death. 
While defendant carried his loaded gun for "protection" 
(R.954), he knew that Bo Zahorka, a Caucasian thirty-eight-year-
old male, was not connected with the Hispanic gang that had 
killed his friend and previously threatened him (R. 999, 1005, 
1024-25, 1034). By the time Bo exited his truck, that fear was 
"completely dismissed" (R. 1005. 1024-25). 
Similarly, while defendant was "upset" and "sad" over his 
dad's drinking, this did not influence his decision to shoot Bo 
(R. 1035-36). Nor did defendant's own drinking affect his 
8
 The jury was instructed on self-defense and manslaughter (R. 183-85,187,188,189-
92); the jury rejected these theories and convicted defendant of murder (R. 229-31). There was 
no claim below that the shooting was accidental. 
13 
thinking or control his actions (R. 1035) . 
Defendant's explanation for why he fired was self-defense 
(R. 962-65, 1030). He felt threatened and trapped even though Bo 
was unarmed, had his hands to his sides, and had done nothing 
more than yell and push him, a push that did not even leave a 
bruise (R. 1008-09, 1004, 1011, 1012, 1015, 1030-31, 1036). 
Defendant believed he needed to point the gun at Bo to make Bo 
"leave him alone" (R. 1036). But when Bo laughed, pointing did 
not seem "enough," so he cocked the gun (R. 1014). And when Bo 
called him "a little punk," he fired (R. id). 
Bo never used the phone. He just died (R. 692). 
SUMMIT OF AEOTMSNT 
The determinative issue raised in this appeal is whether the 
police were justified in making a warrantless entry into 
defendant's family's home minutes after a fatal shooting to seize 
defendant, who had been identified as the assailant. 
The trial court found the entry proper based on the oral 
consent of defendant's father, the owner of the home. Below, 
defendant conceded that the father could validly give consent and 
admitted that the father did in fact consent. The issue then and 
now is whether that consent was voluntary* 
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The trial court properly considered the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the consent, including 
the father's initial detention at gunpoint, his subsequent 
"release/' and his demeanor and recent consumption of alcohol. 
After hearing the testimony of several officers and the father, 
the court concluded that the consent was voluntary. Neither the 
court's factual findings nor legal conclusion are in error. 
Following the initial consent, the father subsequently 
provided a second written consent to enter the home and search 
for the murder weapon. Defendant does not attack the 
voluntariness of this consent but claims that if the first entry 
was illegal, the second consent was not sufficiently attenuated 
from the original entry so as to be legally valid. 
However, even if the first consent was not voluntary — and 
therefore invalid to justify the initial entry -- the second 
consent was nevertheless valid. The trial court considered 
alternative grounds to justify the initial entry, and concluded 
that apart from consent, exigent circumstances and probable cause 
justified the warrantless entry to seize defendant. 
The police were investigating a fatal shooting. Within 
minutes of the shooting, they were provided with information that 
two suspects had fled to a nearby home. The police surrounded 
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the home, identified themselves, and told the occupants to come 
out. When the father emerged, the police learned that the armed 
suspects were somewhere within the home and possibly planning an 
escape. A crowd of on-lookers was gathering, traffic was heavy, 
other homes were in close proximity, and the police feared for 
their own safety as well as others. Given these circumstances, 
the trial court properly found that the police were faced with 
exigent circumstances. Therefore, based on probable cause, they 
were justified in entering the home for the limited purpose of 
seizing the suspects. 
Since the first entry was justified, based on either consent 
and in the alternative, exigent circumstances, there is no reason 
to engage in an attenuation analysis in connection with the 
second otherwise uncontested voluntary consent. 
Further, even assuming arguendo that the warrantless entries 
were not legally justified, admission of the evidence seized 
would not constitute reversible error, in light of the other 
independent substantial and unchallenged evidence to support 
defendant's conviction. Eyewitnesses identified defendant as the 
person who shot Bo Zahorka and defendant admitted that he did. 
The only issue was why he intentionally shot him. Admission of 
the physical evidence did not influence the jury's determination 
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of this issue; thus, the alleged improper denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition would, at most, 
constitute harmless constitutional error. 
ARgUMENT 
POINT I 
BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT'S FATHER 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS HOME 
Defendant first claims that the trial court incorrectly 
found exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into 
defendant's home to seize him and the other suspect (Brief of 
Appellant [Br.App.], Point IA at 15-22). However, defendant's 
analysis begins at the wrong point. While the trial court found 
exigent circumstances, it did so alternatively to its ruling that 
defendant's father voluntarily consented to the search. Thus, if 
the consent is valid, there is no reason to analyze the 
alternative grounds of exigency. For this reason, the State's 
analysis will begin with the voluntariness of the father's 
consent and then analyze the exigent circumstances.9 
9
 Point I of the State' Brief (consent) will, therefore, respond to Point IB of defendant's 
brief. Point II of the State's Brief (exigency) answers defendant's Point IA. 
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A. Voluntariness of consent is primarily fact-specific 
and dependent upon the totality of the circumstances. 
A "trial court's ultimate conclusion that a consent was 
voluntary or involuntary is to be reviewed for correctness [but 
the] court's underlying factual findings will not be set aside 
unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted). 
"The application of the clearly erroneous standard to the trial 
court's factual findings recognizes the trial court's advantaged 
position in judging credibility and resolving evidentiary 
conflicts." Id. at 1271 (citing favorably State v. Vigil, 815 
P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah App. 1991)). On the other hand, the "legal 
content of voluntariness" is better decided collectively by the 
appellate court with their ability to provide "state-wide 
standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial 
officials." Id. However, this Court will afford a "measure of 
discretion" to trial court's determination because the legal 
standard is "highly fact dependent and the fact patterns are 
quite variable." See State v. Hodson. 907 P. 2d 1155, 1157 
(Utah 1995) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 
1994)) . 
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For this reason, consent remains "primarily a factual 
question," SctoecklQth v, gyst^mpnt^/ 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 
(1973), dependent upon the "'totality of the circumstances --
both the characteristics of the [person consenting] and the 
details o f police conduct." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 689)). Accord 
State v. Harmon. 910 P. 2d 1196, 1206 (Utah 1995). 
Because of the fact-dependent nature of voluntariness 
findings, a defendant challenging such findings must "marshal all 
the evidence supporting the challenged findings and then show 
that despite that evidence, the findings are clearly lacking in 
support." In re M.S.. 815 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah App. 1991). 
Merely focusing on the evidence supporting the defendant's 
contentions or arguing selective portions of the record does not 
satisfy this requirement. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). Here, defendant simply argues the 
same factual contentions rejected by the trial court. When 
properly marshaled, however, the record evidence supports the 
trial court's findings and ultimate conclusion of voluntariness. 
B. The Facts Surrounding the Initial Oral Consent and 
Seizure of Defendant. 
Within minutes of the shooting, the police arrived at the 
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station to find Bo Zahorka bleeding from a chest wound and 
obviously dying (R. 279-80, 299-300, 323) . A woman approached 
Officer Sampson and told him that "she saw who did it and where 
they ran to" (R. 599). Just then, two teenage boys ran up and 
told Sampson that they saw who did it and knew "which way they 
ran" (R. 600, 629) . Apparently, the same three witnesses were 
more clear with Officer Langley and told him that while they did 
not see the actual shooting, they heard the gunshot and then 
immediately saw the suspects, two male Hispanics, run into a 
house about 100 feet north of the Phillips Station (R. 280, 286, 
639). The woman also told Officer Langley that the suspects had 
dropped a beer bottle as they ran (R.286). Officer Langley 
walked towards the house and found the broken beer bottle, with 
still-foaming beer spilling out (R. 286). 
More officers gathered on the scene as did fire and medical 
personnel (R. 279-80, 287, 323). The crowd of curious on-lookers 
increased. The intersection was a busy one. With the victim 
laying bleeding at the station and the suspects concealed in a 
house only a short distance away, traffic was becoming a problem. 
(R. 289-90, 302-304). Additionally, a helicopter was landing to 
airlift the victim (R. 302). 
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The outside of the house where the suspects had fled was 
dark, but lights were on inside (R. 288). The police did not 
know whose home it was or how many people were inside, but they 
could see movement through the windows (R. 342). The police 
were "concerned both for the people inside the house and the fact 
that there may be suspects hidden inside the house for our own 
safety" (R. 291). 
The police contacted dispatch to telephone the occupants; 
dispatch could not make contact (R. 287-88, 325). At that point, 
the police decided they had to get inside and detain the 
suspects, who were armed and perhaps intoxicated.10 (R.291, 325-
26) . 
Officers walked up the stairs to the unlit front porch with 
their guns drawn while other officers surrounded the home (R. 
290-92, 303-04, 307, 310, 336, 337, 351). The officers announced 
their presence and ordered the occupants to come out (R. 342). 
Defendant's uncle, who was intoxicated, stumbled out the door and 
was passed through to officers on the lawn (R. 291-92). 
The officers on the porch "could look into the house. The 
front door was open. There was a screen door. [Officer Langley] 
10
 No gun had been recovered at the scene and the suspects dropped a beer bottle as they 
fled (R. 285-286,289). 
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observed a male Hispanic approximately 40 years of age seated in 
a chair facing toward the door who appeared to be watching 
television" (R. 292). He could not see anyone else. He called 
through the door, identified himself as a deputy sheriff, and 
asked the male, later identified as defendant's father, James 
Archuleta, to step outside (R. 292). Mr. Archuleta asked, 
"What's going on?" (R. 293). The officer repeated the request 
for him to step outside; when he did, he was "proned" on the 
ground, that is, positioned laying face down (R. 306, 309, 335). 
(But see R. 308-09, 316.) He was patted down for weapons (R. 
342). When none were found, the officers re-holstered their guns 
or placed them in the "low-ready" position (R. 326-29). None 
were pointed at Mr. Archuleta (R. 316-17). Having determined 
that he was not armed and did not match the description of the 
suspects, Mr. Archuleta was immediately allowed to stand up (R. 
335, 293, 339, 343). 
Officer Langley explained that the police were investigating 
a crime which had occurred across the street and had reason to 
believe that the people who were involved had just run into his 
house (R. 293). The officer wasked his permission to go look and 
see if the people we believed were there were inside" (R. 293). 
Mr. Archuleta told Officer Lanagley and Sgt. Smith that his son 
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and a friend had just: come in and had asked him if he could drive 
them away (R. 294, 345). Mr. Archuleta said he thought they were 
still in the house but did not know where; he gave oral 
permission for the police to enter the home and find them (R. 
293, 294, 316, 333-34, 344-45).12 
Pursuant to Mr. Archuleta's oral consent, the officers 
entered the home. They found defendant, Devin, and defendant's 
fourteen-year-old brother, Joey (R. 294-95, 330). The officers 
handcuffed all three and detained them in the living room (R. 
331, 605, 647). When Joey sat down next to defendant and Devin 
on the couch, Officer Anjewierden told him to move to the other 
end (R. 647). When he did, the officer observed a box of .22 
caliber shells on the cushions which the officer had not seen 
previously (R. 647, 650) . The officer "bagged" the suspects' 
hands to preserve any evidence of gunpowder residue (R. 64 8-
11
 Sgt. Smith also characterized Mr. Archuleta as freely volunteering information (R. 
343-45 ). At first, Sgt. Smith felt that Mr. Archuleta did not know why the police were there, so 
the sergeant explained "why we were there, and we had witnesses that informed us that the 
suspect had fled form [sic] across the street into that residence, and I asked for his cooperation... 
I also asked him if we could have the consent to search, to enter the residence to look for a 
suspect; if we could have his permission. And he gave his permission" (R. 343-44). Mr. 
Archuleta then volunteered that the "two individuals who had entered the residence in the last 
few minutes were his son and his buddy, his son's friend." The father thought they were still in 
the house but he was not sure where; he thought "[t]hey could be upstairs" but he was not sure, 
because "they wanted [the father] to drive them away from the scene" (R. 345). 
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49) .12 
Once the officers knew that they had located all persons in 
the home and detained the suspects, they did not further search 
(R. 297-98. 331, 347). Instead, pursuant to policy, the patrol 
officers detained the suspects and called the homicide detectives 
(R. 315). 
C Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's 
father voluntarily consented to the initial search of his 
home for purposes of seizing defendant. 
In the trial court, defendant asserted that his father, Mr. 
Archuleta, who had been drinking the day before and day of Bo 
Zahorka's murder, "may or may not have been intoxicated to the 
degree" that would undermine the voluntariness of his consent (R. 
4 09). During the suppression hearing, Mr. Archuleta admitted 
that he had been drinking, but never claimed this eroded his 
decision-making ability or affected his recall of the events (R. 
378, 382, 389-90). The trial court found that: 
Mr. Archuleta had been consuming alcohol and was likely 
intoxicated to some degree, but nevertheless he 
understood that he was speaking with law enforcement 
officers and wished to be cooperative with their 
investigative efforts. His cooperation was not 
affected by intoxication. 
12
 A subsequent test revealed that defendant's hands tested positive for the presence of 
gunpowder residue (R. 746). 
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(R. 236) . See Addendum A, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, Paragraph 6. While mischaracterizing Mr. Archuleta as 
"noticeably intoxicated" (Br.App. at 35), defendant does not 
challenge on appeal the trial court's finding on intoxication 
(Br.App. at 32-34) . 
Instead, defendant claims that Mr. Archuleta's oral consent 
was a product of duress and coercion in that the police entered 
the home without permission and then forced Mr. Archuleta to exit 
the home at gunpoint, held him on the ground at gunpoint, and 
then coercively extracted his consent (Br.App. at 22-34) . 
Certainly, a "'consent' that is the product of duress and 
coercion is not a consent at all." Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 
(citing Florida v> BPStick, 501 U.S. 429, 438 (1991)). 
Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion include 
"1) the absence of a claim of authority to search 
by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of 
force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) 
cooperation by the [person consenting]; and 5) the 
absence of deception or trick on the part of the 
officer." State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 106 
(Utah 1980). 
Harmon. 910 P.2d at 1206. No one factor is determinative: "'The 
question is whether the officers used coercive tactics or took 
unfair advantage of . . . the situation to obtain consent.'" Id. 
(quoting 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2.(b), at 182 
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(1987)) (other citations omitted). Applying the Whittenback 
factors, the trial court properly concluded that the father's 
oral consent was not coerced. Despite the exigencies of the 
situation, the police did not claim that they had authority to 
search, but merely requested permission (R. 293, 343). See 
Addendum A, Findings, Paragraphs 8 & 15. In doing so, the police 
did not use trickery or deception, but fully explained the basis 
for the investigation and why they believed the suspects were in 
Mr. Archuleta's home (id.) Despite the initial encounter on the 
porch, by the time of the consent, Mr. Archuleta was cooperative 
and even volunteered information concerning the suspects (R. 2 94, 
344-45) . See Addendum A, Findings, Paragraphs 6, 7 & 15. 
Before the police obtained defendant's father's consent, 
they faced an unusual situation. Unlike the more typical consent 
situation such as a request for consent to search following a 
routine traffic stop, the police were in the midst of a homicide 
investigation. Witnesses had identified the suspects as fleeing 
the scene to a nearby home. The murder weapon had not been 
recovered and was presumptively with the suspects. Given these 
circumstances, the police naturally approached the front door 
with caution and guns drawn. See supra at 21-22 and Addendum, 
Findings, Paragraph 5. 
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When defendant's father, Mr. Archuleta came out, the police 
initially detained and patted him down for weapons. When none 
were found and the police determined he was not a suspect, Mr. 
Archuleta was allowed to stand free. See supra at 21-22 and 
Addendum A, Findings, Paragraph 5. 
Officer Langley and Sgt. Smith then explained to Mr. 
Archuleta their need to find the suspects and "askesd his 
permission to go look and see if the people we believed were 
there were inside" (R. 293, 343-44) . In response, the father 
volunteered that his son and a friend had just run into the house 
and asked for him to quickly drive them away . The father told 
the officers that they "could go and search the house" (R. 294, 
345). The officers then went in and found the suspects and 
defendant's teenage brother. See Addendum A, Findings, 
Paragraphs 7 & 8. 
The only Whittenback factor colorably in question is the 
exhibition of force displayed by the police when they originally 
encountered Mr. Archuleta. However, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the trial court properly found that at the time of 
the consent, the initial force had been substantially dissipated 
and did not undermine the voluntariness of the consent. See 
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Addendum A, Findings, Paragraphs 5, 6, 8 & 15. 
The officers testified as well as the father. Some of the 
testimony was conflicting. See Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1271 (trial 
court is in the best position to resolve credibility issues). 
See also Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1262. But taken together, the 
evidence established that the police drew their guns when they 
first detained the father on top of the porch (R. 290-92, 303-04, 
307, 310, 336, 337, 351) .13 Once the father was out of the house, 
the guns were either holstered or kept at the low-ready position 
(R. 326-29, 316, 17). No guns were aimed at the father when his 
consent was obtained, nor was he handcuffed or on the ground 
(id.). Instead, once the police knew that the father posed no 
threat and was not a suspect, he was treated as a witness. 
But while defendant ignores the change in circumstances from 
initial detention to time of consent, the trial court did not. 
Instead, the court properly considered all the testimony and 
13
 Defendant contends that Officer Langley claimed that guns were not drawn 
contradicting the testimony of other officers (Br.App. at 24-25). Defendant's assertion is not 
supported by the record, which reflects some conflicting but no contradictory testimony. Officer 
Langley testified that when he approached the front door, his gun was not drawn but the other 
officers' were, even though he was not sure of the number (R. 290-91, 307, 308,310,316-17). 
Officer Sampson testified that his own gun was drawn and was not asked about other officers (R. 
327-29,335,337-38); Sgt. Smith testified that he had his gun drawn as did several officers, one 
of which he was "pretty sure" was Langley (R. 342-43,351,355-56). In sum, the officers 
consistently testified that several officers had their guns drawn as they approached the door. The 
trial court agreed. !§££ Addendum A, Findings, Paragraphs 5 & 15. 
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reasonably found: 
Not knowing whose house the suspects had entered, 
Deputy Langley first summoned other deputies to be 
posted in a perimeter around the house to prevent 
escape, then he directed James Archuleta out of the 
house to be searched and interviewed. As Mr. Archuleta 
complied, he was watched at gunpoint as he exited the 
house, was made to lay prone on the front lawn, and 
upon being subjected to a pat-down search was found to 
not be in possession of any weapons. He was then 
allowed to stand, whereupon the deputies holstered 
their weapons or pointed them in non-threatening 
positions. 
(R. 235-236; Addendum A, Findings, Paragraph 5). Thus, at the 
time of the consent, Mr. Archuleta was no longer forcibly 
detained and knew that the focus of the investigation was not 
himself, but his son. Most importantly, Mr. Archuleta knew that 
the only reason for the police initially drawing their weapons 
was protection. Compare Hodson, 907 P.2d at 1157 (reasonable 
inference when police hold gun to suspect's head and order him to 
spit-out evidence is that failure to comply will result in use of 
gun) . 
Defendant's own evidence does not support his claim that Mr. 
Archuleta's initial consent was coerced. During the suppression 
hearing, Mr. Archuleta did not claim that his consent was a 
product of coercion: he simply denied orally consenting to the 
initial entry (R. 376-78). (Cf. Harmon. 910 P.2d at 1208 (being 
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handcuffed could have no impact on consent where defendant 
refused to consent).) The trial court did not credit Mr. 
Archuleta's denial. See Addendum A, Findings, Paragraph 8. 
Defendant also asserts that Mr. Archuleta did not 
voluntarily emerge from his home but was seized at the threshold 
and forcibly "pulled" from it (Br.App. at 9, 23-28). Defendant 
argues that the trial court's findings are incomplete and 
inadequate because they fail to resolve the issue of whether the 
police had entered the home to detain Mr. Archuleta (as Mr. 
Archuleta claimed, see R. 367-78) or whether Mr. Archuleta had 
come out of the home in response to the police's oral directive 
(as the officers testified, see R. 293, 306, 326, 333-34, 342, 
351). However, the language of the findings makes clear that the 
court accepted the officers' testimony over that of Mr. 
Archuleta: Officer Langley "directed" Mr. Archuleta out of the 
house; Mr. Archuleta "complied"; as he complied, he was 
"watched." See Addendum A, Findings, Paragraph 5. 
The trial court's findings concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the initial consent are supported by the record and 
its conclusion of voluntariness is consistent with case law. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1273 ("custody alone is not enough in itself 
to establish improper coercion"); Cf. id. at 1272 (allowing 
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defendant to respond to police presence at door while fully 
dressed is less coercive than bursting unannounced into home and 
awakening occupants) ,• Harmon. 910 P.2d at 12 07 (despite being 
originally handcuffed, "indignation of arrest" had passed and 
defendant appeared friendly and cooperative); Whittenback. 621 
P.2d 106 (no trickery or show of undue force in obtaining 
consent). For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded 
that the initial oral consent was valid. 
POINT II 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFIED 
THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY TO SEIZE DEFENDANT 
While the trial court concluded that defendant's father 
validly consented to the warrantless entry into his home to seize 
defendant, the court alternatively concluded that exigent 
circumstances and probable cause existed to justify the entry. 
The State reponds to defendant's attack on the court's findings 
and conclusions on exigency.14 (See Br.App. at 15-22). However, 
this Court need not address the issue if it finds Mr. Archuleta's 
oral consent to be voluntary. 
14
 Defendant does not attack the trial court's conclusion that probable cause existed. 
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A. Exigency is fact-dependent and must be consider er? 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
Generally, a warrantless enzi± a^d search ci a ;4wu.c ^ s per 
se unreasonable State v. Rrhe. ^ ^ ^ re 2255, 125P /TT"ah ^ ° ^ V . 
r,v iri€ aires: ^.QH v. N^w i'gi^ -.L ". •" ~' - " ,1561,
 f 
Steacra^ ^ L ^ ^ „ ^ f i ; ^ & . » - •• "nwever, 
v,ii^ii police are faced wiin exigent cixcumstances :>-* v g 
immediate action, the federal and state constitutions perm.it a 
war i ant] ess ent] : y I d See also State v. Andei soi i. 910 1. .Jul ", 
1236 (Utah 1996) . l ' • • 
Exigencies **]? -;r*-~ *-v~ categories; predicated cr' different 
r • p ' -a • - * • • 
based •" eccar.:::::;:*. -J • ! - i isk t:_di evidence will be destroyed 
or removed before a warrant is secured On the other h^~J r 
warrantless entry to sei ze a persoi i :i s pi edi cated on a fear of 
injury or harm, to other persons on the scene, including police 
of £ i cer £ • 3 Wa y inc !'" I .d Fd \/< , Seai ::: h a nd Se i zm e § 6 1 (f) (1 996) 
is Defendant cites to both constitutional provisions but does not independently brief the 
state constitutional question. Therefore, this Court should treat only the federal issue. State v. 
Hovater. No. 940618, slip op at 2 n 1 (Utah. March 20,1996). 
The rationale underlying the exigent circumstances safety 
exception is compelling: 
The business of policemen . . . is to act, not to 
speculate or meditate on whether [a report of an 
emergency] is correct. People could well die in 
emergencies if police tried to act with the calm 
deliberation associated with the judicial process. 
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir. 1963) 
(emphasis in original),cert, denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963). Accord 
Whittenback, 621 P.2d at 105 (officers not only have the right 
but the duty to respond to suspicious activity). For this 
reason, 
u[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid 
serious injury is justification for what would be 
otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1978) (quoting Wayne, 
318 F.2d at 212). Recognition that seizures of person, as 
opposed to property, create special risks to law enforcement 
underlies all protective police measures. Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (recognizing the "hot pursuit" exception 
to the warrant requirement); Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) 
(pat-downs for weapons permissible); State v. Belgard, 840 P.2d 
819, 822 (Utah 1992) (officer's safety justifies warrantless 
entry); State v. Chapman, 272 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 8-10 (Utah 1995), 
pet. rehearing pending (weapons search permissible for officer's 
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s,i fen,•) I "itcite v L'aite:i
 ( ' 11 Ill" ,"»I i." , i.'.'" ! 111 ,111 I "111".' (| >,11 «I• /11 
during investigative stop permissible). 
Whether exigent circumstances exist is a fact-dependent 
determi nat:i c i i si it ject t :: a b:i fi n cated standai d c -f i ei d e w 
trial court's factual findings wi ] 1 not be disturbed on appeal 
unless clearly erroneous. State v. Ashe, 745 P, 2d 1255, II 258 
(Utah 198//. The court's legal conclusion based on those 
findings is reviewed unde: a correct! r: ~f error standard. Ci ty 
of Oi en i v „ Hei n ie . - ipp , 1 994 ) ( : :i tii ig 
Thurman, 846 P. 2d at 1LJ± \~t . .icwevt.* , ~ measure of 
discretion" must he accorded the t^:sn < — u ^ ' n determination" 
h- ~ :• '- :• deride nt ai id the fact 
patterns --re c;;:v variable." Hodson, 907 P. 2d at 1157; Pena. 
& ,. . ^ 
Factors Lraditionally considered in deternur:r > --' i 
exigency exists include: (1 ) the natui e of the offense under 
i - - - ) 
reasonable suspicion that * k " suspect ~s aimed ^ jangacuo, w, 
the trustworthiness of the :i nformation that the suspect has 
C o m m i t t &r] r , y i c: -^r .1^ 1711 t t 1 PC| ,111 O f f P. 11 R P ; ( - I ) I !l»" i"U tH" e T1 '"^  I: h Of t i n 
belief that the suspect is on the premises to be searched; (5) 
the iikeJJhood u( I he suspect escaping ii not quickly 
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apprehended; and (6) the nature of the entry made. Dorman v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 385(D.C. Cir. 1970). Other relevant 
factors are: (7) whether the officers were in hot pursuit of a 
fleeing suspect; and (8) whether the seizure was planned or 
unplanned. See LaFave, § 6.1 (f) at 263-73. Accord State v. 
Flowers, 789 P.2d 333, 338 (Wash. App.), rev. denieid, 797 P.2d 
511 (Wash. 1990) . 
B. Under the totality of the circumstances/ the police 
properly responded to the exigency of the circumstances 
they faced in an evolving murder investigation. 
The facts supporting this exigent entry are compelling. 
However, defendant once again fails to properly marshal these 
facts, choosing instead to focus on selected evidence favorable 
to his position. See Crookston. 817 P.2d at 799 (selective 
presentation of evidence does not meet the marshaling 
requirement). A full review of all the facts demonstrates that 
they support the trial court's determination of exigency. 
The police unexpectedly found themselves faced with a 
murder. The victim was bleeding to death at a gas station while 
the two armed suspects had just fled to what appeared to be an 
occupied home across the street. Because of the hour and 
location of the shooting, many bystanders were in the vicinity, 
as were police, fire, and medical personnel. The house the 
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Addendum C, Exhibits 2 & 6 (photographs of station and 
defendant's family home across the street). 
App I ,"tn<i 1 In- 1 mii'it IMII.II friM cu f" , t lit "i inv- lie iii'i 
investigated was a recent (committed .ess * nan ii ir.^r* jt.es 
1 * ; _; -. nrazen (committe : : -i ' - < vt^itnesses^ , violent 
homicide
 va pointblank fixing to the •— ~ - l 
investigation '• undercover evidence, t::.;s investigation *. s- ize 
t . . - • - . - .:, i ..., •••»*«. . / , ; , n c e y , 4 
I ;: a-. ."-;•:--4 ,ni exigencies u
 j w s i^i ) i^ui aQ] orcp^r* / t>eaich 
following homicide) , A c^r v a i beer "sed hu*~ :v ;?*:•. j „cs i . e - . 
f o u n d * "i' r i i h fj s i" <CJ n e , r e a P 
the suspects were armed a:,i aangeroii
 fc . aFave at -61 ai^ 
Cctses cited therein Multiple eyewitnesses had identified the 
suspects as fleeing the scene just niiiiiitr s before and 1 lien 
entering a home in residential area across the street, iit,£ 
LaFavij -:\\ ," I il'h""""]! I li--' lalhei ex.i, \.e* I Llie home, he c ont i lined 
that his son and a friend had just run into the home ana wexe 
stiJL there, Id The tat her also sai d the suspects wanted • •: 
immediately leave the scene 1 c;| - ::s 
were pi a: -•-:•* -c .13 hove been planned. id. They were 
*
 ; -. emergency. 
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Based on these facts, the trial court properly found (a) the 
shooting had occurred no more than five minutes before the police 
arrived; (b) witnesses identified suspects as immediately fleeing 
to a house a short distance away; (c) the officers did not know 
whose house the suspects had entered so posted a perimeter around 
the house to prevent escape; (d) the father of one of the 
suspects confirmed that the suspects had just entered the house 
and volunteered that they requested to be immediately driven 
away; (e) the officers entered the home with the father's 
permission; and (f) the officers conducted only a protective 
sweep to locate and detain the suspects. See Addendum A, 
Findings, Paragraphs 3-5 and 7-9. 
Defendant attacks these findings by misrepresenting the 
record evidence. According to defendant, the trial prosecutor 
conceded that the police were not in hot pursuit of the suspects 
because of a significant passage of time (Br.App. at 18). In 
fact, the prosecutor recognized that while the police were in 
fact in pursuit of fleeing felons, legally they were not in hot 
pursuit since the "hot pursuit doctrine" requires the police to 
initiate the arrest outside the home (R. 426) . See State v. 
Ramirez. 814 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Utah App. 1991) (explaining "hot 
pursuit" doctrine). 
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Similarly, defendant asserts that the police admitted that 
the only reason they did not get a warrant 'was because it "was 
i i f I1 M P \ S J : , M b i L i I '1 , " " • A , | jl " • • " h i s 
ir.;srepres^nr s * r- recoru. _ e officer who made this statement 
c.iaLi:*. i^ v-?'" referring to tu~ r e a ? ^ why he did not 
secure d wc * : He exp I ,i i n^J 
thd\ his ^i c- a irf:i. fficer was *r se ure tr.e pre^iseL and 
v . . . • . * uo i o. . - -^  1 r ' - -J ^
 w h y 
tne patrc- officers waited an nuui I U I tnc nomicide jc* --
arrive. When the detectives arrived, written consent was 
obta i ned negatd i ig a .i i} I ega] :i: eg i i:i i: ei i \e i it fc :i : a \ \ ai i ai it (R 3 6 ; ) , 
None of these statements relate to the first search. 
Defendant next a t t a c h *-he court's determination,, of exigency 
by claimi riq t hat riii' '" ^lTiorgprn )'" t hia! e: : i si: e d d i s s Ipat, i "i i.'iu.'e 
Archuleta was observed watching television in the hcust_. He, 
f *•- .--;-•. :.., .he suspects had I ittle chance of escape and 
the weapon ccu^d not be edSi±y destroyed. 
7v—,^ +-h^~r assertions ignore the record evidence ana the pu.-ei 
findings 
When. Mr Archuleta was observed inside the home, the police 
hc*d in "I'M who he was or how many others were inside. Once he 
exited, the police were able i i» tl III,„:I : ee teenage t • :>;;, » s 
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were still in the home and possessed at least one weapon. They 
also knew that two of the boys were trying to get away. None of 
this information reduced the danger to the police or others; 
instead, it increased it. The suspects were aware of the police 
presence and had expressed a wish to flee rather than face 
apprehension. The police had established a perimeter around the 
home but this would not necessarily preclude an attempted escape 
or a "shoot-out." See Ashe 745 P. 2d at 1260. The home was in 
the middle of a residential section, on a busy street, and near 
where medical personal were working on the victim and other 
officers were interviewing witnesses. And even though a family 
member was inside, this did not preclude the suspects from using 
the fourteen-year-old brother as a hostage. 
Finally, contrary to defendant's argument, while defendant, 
Devin, and defendant's brother were not able to "destroy" the 
weapon, they were able to "modify" the evidence in the few 
minutes before their apprehension. The previously fully loaded 
weapon was unloaded and hidden (R. 637, 983) . Fingerprints were 
apparently wiped clean (R. 671-72, 1024). But whether the 
seizure of the gun could be justified by the exigencies of the 
situation is irrelevant in any event. The court's exigency 
determination was limited to the first entry where defendant was 
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not claim an exigency still existed. By that time, the suspects 
were detained and the house secured. Instead, the cffleers 
t e s t i f i e d , and t l le t i : :i a 1 cc i :ii: t con ::1 1 i ded, t i le se ::: Diid ei l t r y w ass 
c o n s e n s u a l . 
xerendant i.-- . a i i c . ^o ^ s t a ; - . . ? ] ? ^~-r 
e r r o r m Lne t i i a i c o u r t s f i n d i n g s 01 c o n c i u s - ' •-• \ v. 
POINT I I I 
EVEN IB THIS COURT WERE TO RULE THE WARRANTLESS INITIAL 
ENTRY INVALID, THAT RULING WOULD NEITHER UNDERMINE THE 
VALIDITY OP THE SECOND CONSENT NOR OTHERWISE CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
"* *• nn appeal the validity ol 
the seccr.jL wi^tten consent o^iainea fi^m his father one hour 
after the initial entry. Instead,, he asserts tha* if the firs' 
sufficiently aLienuaLed fi r. s . i^^e^-i err^ry s^ ao i^ jje valid 
Detencuiif's argument ir without T ? " : " . 
Howev^i, tven assuming :• guenau tuat * * re 
invalid *-\^r^ J~ Fubstant*a. independent. eviaenc> • support 
de f •'<-* * - * * . oneoup 
admission of the physical evidence seized would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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A. The Facts Surrounding the Second Written Consent 
and Seizure of the Murder Weapon and Ammunition. 
Homicide Detective Judd arrived on the scene around 8:00 
p.m, about an hour after defendant had been seized. (R. 346, 
359). Defendant and Devin were still handcuffed and detained in 
the living room (R. 386-87). Detective Judd, accompanied by Sgt. 
Smith, approached defendant's father, who was sitting in the 
kitchen, to obtain a written consent to search the home for the 
murder weapon (R. 363, 386). Mr. Archuleta was in "good 
condition. He was sitting in the kitchen where this all took 
place, if I remember right, and he was just taking everything in 
and listening, and he was sober, coherent. I mean he was paying 
attention; no problem whatsoever" (R. 363) . The detective 
explained the police's desire to search for the murder weapon and 
asked if he would consent to a search (R. 363, 377-78). Mr. 
Archuleta was "very cooperative, and signed this consent without 
any hesitation whatsoever" (R. 371); it appeared that he was 
trying to assist the officers, he "was friendly. He wasn't 
antagonistic towards us" (R. 357). Mr. Archuleta testified that 
he "willingly" signed the consent (R. 356, 388). He testified 
that he saw no reason not to cooperate with the police, since he 
had nothing to hide (R. 389). He "took it upon" himself not to 
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warrant; he figured that if he consented, xL would *get them in 
ai id out :: £ tl le house" faster "° QQQN According to Mr 
Archuleta, his decision to consent w.i. i 1 iffpi'leil I i Iris 
original detention at gunpoint, by the police (R. 3 88-89) . See 
Addend") im B Wi : :ii 1 1 e i i Coi i s ei 11: t: o Se ai ch. 
-. Based on Mr Archuleta's wiitLen consent, the police re-
entered the ho~^ *-~ search for the murder weapon. They found the 
iB/t:J : j : :i 3tc • ] 1 :i :i dden ::i i : a I: < : : : ::i i ,i ,. I  I  : n 
{h 6 2 8 - 6 — *:* unloaded (R. 637). Boxes of .22 caliber 
ammunition were found in separate locations i n the home (R, 640). 
B • "liits second consent was unaffected 1: j t:J::ii s • 
circumstances of the first entry. 
"consent to search following illegal police activity i ei 
valid unaex tue : 
tests are v:ef consent was j:\-n vc, ,r*a: s2 , < ^^, 
:[-• ••.-•- - -. • if cJjJHci by poll ice exploitation of the prd^r 
:2.ecaiiLi.- Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (citing ££a£fi_3L. Arro y o, 
796 T-.26 fQ4 f°° 'Utah 1990)) Factors to be considered in 
determining i :! i cc msent :i s attei mated :i nc] i ide ,; 'tl: le j: in pose and 
flagrancy of the official misconduct, the temporal proximity of 
the i llecjd I it..y and Lhe consent, =?r?.H f h ° presence of intervening 
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circumstances." Id. at 1263 (citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court never reached the issue of attenuation 
because it found no illegal police activity. But assuming 
arguendo that this Court concluded that the first entry was 
justified by neither Mr. Archuleta's oral consent nor exigent 
circumstances, there is still no basis to invalidate the second 
written consent. 
At the time the officers obtained the written consent, they 
reasonably believed that the initial entry was justified either 
by the prior oral consent or exigent circumstances. One hour had 
passed and the scene was now more secure and serene. Mr. 
Archuleta was sitting in the kitchen but not detained. He 
appeared cooperative and responsive. By this point, Mr. 
Archuleta was also fully aware that the police would only search 
with a warrant or his permission. They had confined their first 
search to the scope of the consent. See Addendum, Findings, 
Paragraphs 9 & 10 . They were now waiting for the homicide 
detectives to arrive before searching any further, 
Mr. Archuleta further testified that, independent of the 
police request for permission to search, he saw no reason to hold 
the police up by requiring them to get a warrant. Compare 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1207 (police should reframe from asserting 
43 
that they w!"!n ie' a warrant if no consent is given) He had 
n o 11: i i n g !:  : I i i d e a i i ::i f i g u i: e ci t h a t h e w o u 1 d g e t t h e - ? u t o f h i s 
house faster if he consented. Mr. Archuleta viewed his dec - -
as voluntary a~J unaffected by } \r ci"qi:;a" brief detention. 
B a s e * . i • : — • : - , - •:,:.:_ 
was untainted hv a trier : n i c e action. Accord Thurman. 846 P.2d 
a- . • . -,.. . . . . . a second consent was obtained an hour 
after the first. Mi. Axe;.,.-' - krv-w hr r^ -risi'ii IMI I he 
delac *a.- L: * - ' f , the r; :K'rie detectives ar> i •; . *r.i * . 
t - . •. *;.:.•:: *:* , -eienaant 
had been arrested and the scene secuici. i-^rthermore, =.*- : eriors 
made by the police i n I ntially entering the home were not 
f l a g r a n t hill inrvi" MI Mi" ininu « »i \v;\ ,i horn i c i cle .m I hi-,1 
investigation was evolvinq | -j , 
C. Admission of the murder weapon and ammunition, 
did not influence the jury's verdict. 
When a trial court fails to suppress illegally seized 
evidence, the resulting conviction will not be reversed if 
substantial independent evidence of dei:ji •. •; 
the jury's verdict such that: the appellate ccur+ .^-.v ecnclude, 
beyond a :i : Bason ah ] e c3..c::>i ibt, 1: 1 lat t I: lei e :i s .*.elihood of a 
different result. 
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State v, VUlarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (Sixth 
Amendment violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State 
v. Genovesi. 909 P.2d 916, 922-24 (Utah App. 1995) (Fourth 
Amendment violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Here, 
no reversible error occurred. 
The jury did not base its verdict on the admission of the 
murder weapon and ammunition, but on the eyewitness accounts of 
the shooting. The issue was not who or how but why. Why did 
defendant shoot the victim at pointblank range in the chest? The 
physical evidence added little to this determination. Instead, 
the jury had to judge the reasonableness of defendant's actions. 
The witnesses agreed that up to the time of the shooting, the 
confrontation between defendant and Bo involved nothing more than 
pushing and shoving (R. 798-99, 822-24, 841-44, 851, 1011). The 
witnesses also agree that defendant shot Bo within seconds after 
Bo pushed him (±dL, R. 827-31, 845-48, 1030-31). Defendant 
conceded that at the time Bo was shot, Bo was unairmed (R. 1004) . 
(See also R. 851.) Defendant conceded that when he pointed the 
gun at the victim, he knew it was loaded and was capable of 
causing death (R. 982-83, 1014). Defendant conceded that when he 
fired the gun, it was pointed directly at Bo, with the end of the 
barrel of the gun touching Bo's chest (R. 964-65, 1013, 1016). 
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While: defendant and one witness testified that defendant was 
f r i g h t e n b" rj> ii1 P(v J .1 <n .1 inn
 t pnnny Mdi iza te ; t e s L i i i e d 
that just prior to the a Itercation with the victim, defendant had 
c ' 1 1 a 1 ] €1 1 lg i: • i R : -i 1. i;y t o a f i g J 11 (R 7 ; 4 7 81 - 8 2) ft d d i t i on a 11 y , 
defendant conceded that his fear was lu-usf-vl mi 11 111 M MI id 11 h S 
yelling and a single shove •'?;, 96-- L- 4, ; \t :" • : *r 
G i v e n th«fljii;ie * :-x - , ' . . , 1 : L^er 
admitted into evidence, there is no likelihood of a dxifextv' 
result: I'fendant'9 rla:r ~* S P ] f iefense was not credible in 
light ol une - - »ni dt, [un ninin 
defendarr s * -.—; imc:":\ . , Viilaireal. 889 P.2d at 41;, 2o. 
C0NCW8TQN 
The trial court coricciiy coney; * ^ 
entries to seize defendant and : " - -nurder weapon were justified 
and thei ef01 € pi: oper 3 } dei ii ed defendant' s moti on to suppress . 
The trial court's denial and defendant's conviction of mux der 
should be at firmed,, 
DATED t h i s j £ 7 day nl Finn ]i ! 1 n 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney^^tene^ral 
1 -STINE F :30LTIS 
A s s i s t ar.'_ At torney General 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i l l I SI A II 01 I T U L 
v. 
ANTHONY MARTIN ARCFTTIFT 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 941900652FS 
Honorable HOMER F. WILKINSON 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress having come before this Court for hearing in the above 
adduced at the hearing, having considered the pleadings and other documents filed in this case, having 
reau vingconsidered iiginni ills nl counsel, and nllimviM In ini; 
fully advised in the matter before h, this Court now enters its FINDINGS of FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
of LAW and ORDER: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On February 3,1994, at approximately 6:45 p.m., Deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff 
Timothy Langley proceeded to the area of 3900 South at 300 East in Salt Lake County, Utah, in 
response to an advisement by dispatch that a shooting had occurred. 
2. Deputy Langley arrived at the location of the shooting at 6:48 p.m., having been no more 
than five blocks from the area when dispatched. 
3. Upon his arrival, Deputy Langley observed individuals rendering medical assistance to the 
person later identified as Roland Zahorka; based on his training and experience Deputy Langley 
recognized the resuscitation efforts as CPR, and from his observations of the victim's condition-
specifically the freshness of the blood emanating from the wound-Deputy Langley concluded that the 
shooting had likely occurred no more than five minutes before his arrival. 
4. Because other deputies arrived at the crime scene immediately after Deputy Langley's 
arrival, and because these other ofEcers were securing the crime scene, Deputy Langley began to focus 
his efforts on locating the suspect or suspects who had shot the victim; from witnesses at the scene 
Deputy Langley learned that two male Hispanics had fled toward the northeast, and after he left in that 
direction he was approached by two children who stated that they had heard a gunshot, saw two male 
Hispanics run into the house at 3824 South 300 East immediately after the gunshot, and pointed in the 
direction where Deputy Langley soon discovered a broken beer bottle amidst still-frothing beer. 
5. Not knowing whose house the suspects had entered, Deputy Langley first summoned other 
deputies to be posted in a perimeter around the house to prevent escape, then he directed James 
Archuletta out of the house to be searched and interviewed. As Mr. Archuletta complied, he was 
watched at gunpoint as he exited the house, was made to lay prone on the front lawn, and upon being 
subjected to a pat-down search was found to not be in possession of any weapons. He was then 
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allowed to stand, whereupon the deputies holstered their weapons or pointed them in non-threatening 
positions. 
6. Mr. Archuletta had been consuming alcohol and was likely intoxicated to some degree, but 
nevertheless he understood that he was speaking with law enforcement officers and wished to be 
cooperative with their investigative efforts. His cooperation was not affected by intoxication. 
7. During the initial conversations with officers, Mr. Archuletta identified himself as the owner 
of the house at 3824 South 300 East, reported that his son and a friend had recently entered the house, 
and volunteered that his son had requested that he be immediately driven away from the area of 3900 
South and 300 East. 
8. After being informed that the deputies were searching for the persons who had just shot a 
victim, Mr. Archuletta agreed to allow the officers to enter his house to search for the suspects. 
9. Deputies Langley and Robert Sampson entered the house, where they found and detained 
Anthony Archuletta and Devin Espinoza. Thereafter, the officers conducted a visual "sweep" within 
the residence to ensure that no victim or other suspect or person was present who might pose a threat 
to the officers. 
10. No item of evidence was seized during the protective sweep of the house. 
11. Deputies remained in the house, along with Anthony Archuletta, Devin Espinoza, and 
James Archuletta, until the arrival of Detective Dick Judd, a supervising crime scene investigator; 
during the period before Detective Judd's arrival, no search for evidence was conducted. 
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12. Detective Judd spoke with James Archuletta about the crime being investigated and 
requested that the officers be allowed permission to search the residence for evidence of the shooting. 
At the time the request to search was made, Detective Judd explained that he had information from the 
deputies that led him to bebeve evidence of the shooting would be discovered within the residence. 
13. James Archuletta thereupon willingly signed a witnessed, hand-drafted document which 
recorded his consent to allow a search of his house. He understood at that time the nature and 
contents of the document. 
14. Based on the representations of James Archuletta, Detective Judd and the deputies who 
conducted the search reasonably bebeved that James Archuletta had authority to consent to a search of 
the house, that Mr. Archuletta was continuing to cooperate as he had earber, and that Mr. Archuletta's 
judgment was not impaired by alcohol or otherwise. 
15. Mr. Archuletta's verbal and written consent were not obtained as a result of any 
misrepresentation, threat or inducement, but rather were the product of his free will. 
16. As a result of the search conducted at 3824 South 300 East pursuant to the written 
consent form executed by James Archuletta, a .22 cabber pistol, numerous rounds of .22 cabber 
ammunition, and other physical evidence was seized. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Unreasonable warrantless searches are unlawful, however, when exigent circumstances 
exist, a search pursuant to probable cause, limited in scope by the exigency, is lawful. 
2. Moreover, searches may lawfuby be conducted pursuant to the consent of a third party, 
provided that the person granting consent reasonably appears to possess dominion over the place 
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searched, and the law enforcement officers obtaining the consent make no misrepresentations nor 
engage in coercive conduct. 
3. Exigent circumstances existed in this case where an officer investigating a shooting 
observed that the victim was freshly bleeding, the officer observed that a beer thrown by a fleeing 
suspect was still frothy, and the officer learned that the suspects had probably fled into a nearby house. 
Further, because the officer did not know whether innocent by-standers were inside the house, and 
because he had observed that a large group of people were gathering in the course of the commotion at 
the crime scene, he feared that the safety of innocent people would be jeopardized if the suspects were 
allowed to remain at large. 
4. Probable cause existed to believe that suspects would be discovered by a timely search of a 
residence when two male Hispanics matching the description of suspects who recently shot a victim 
were reported to have entered the house, evidence observable to the officer was fresh and thus 
indicated that the crime occurred very recently, and a perimeter established around the house reduced 
the likelihood that the suspects had escaped. Probable cause was further supported where the owner 
of the house where the suspects hid informed police that they were inside and had recently entered the 
house requesting to be driven away from the area. 
5. Consent to search for the suspects of a crime was validly obtained from a third person when 
that person, James Archuletta, notified officers that the house to be searched was his, and, after he 
volunteered information which strengthened the belief that the suspects would be found inside, he gave 
the officers permission to search for the suspects. Such a search was valid under the totality of the 
circumstances despite the fact that Mr. Archuletta was intoxicated to some degree, and despite the fact 
that he had previously been detained at gunpoint. 
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6. Probable cause existed to believe that further evidence of a crime would be discovered 
inside a residence when two persons matching the description of the suspects in a shooting were 
discovered in the house located less than a block from the crime scene, observations of the officers 
securing the perimeter of the hcaise indicated that the suspects fled to the house immediately after the 
shooting, and the weapon used in the shooting was not discovered on either suspect. 
7. Consent to search for evidence of a crime was also validly obtained from James Archuletta 
where the consent was evidenced in writing, the writing was signed and witnessed, the person granting 
consent owned the house, the consent was obtained without misrepresentation of facts or authority, 
and there was no use of threats or coercion to obtain the consent. 
8. James Archuletta possessed authority to consent to a search where he was the owner or 
otherwise exercised dominion over the place searched. Further, the defendant has stipulated that James 
Archuletta had authority to consent to the search of the house at 3824 South 300 East. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is 
DENIED. 
Dated this / day of October, 1994, 
BY THE COURT: 
OMER R WILKINSON, Judge 
Approved as to form: 
BROOKE WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Order was delivered to Brooke Wells, counsel for defendant, by placing it in the Salt Lake 
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